Communicating: The Hardest Thing We Do

The biggest barrier to good communication is human nature. 

When implementing the system sustainment management model, you quickly find that information-sharing becomes a top priority. The results of great assessment don't automatically become known to the teams that are identifying risks. And the ins and outs of a risk aren't immediately apparent to those designing programs to mitigate the risk. 

All mentally healthy humans see ourselves as something special. Why not? We are the stars of our lives. We came from somewhere and many of us have a solid plan on where we are going. 

This does result in some illogical behavior. 

Researchers have put slightly embarrassing T-shirts on people and put them in a room with others. The T-shirt person consistently reports feeling as though everyone was noticing them and judging them. The others consistently report not noticing the T-shirt and certainly not caring who might be wearing it. 

So much for special. 

Being all wrapped up in ourselves leads to a very predictable behavior during technical briefings. The person briefing launches immediately into the middle of their topic without setting the stage.

Anyone in the audience from ally to enemy, minion or decision-maker, is immediately at a loss as to what the topic is, why it is important, and how it affects them.

Start your briefings with:

A title that reflects the topic and is easily remembered, e.g. "High Failure Rates on Depot G7 Gyro Final Acceptance Automated Testing Equipment"

A one-sentence pitch on why this is important: "If we don't do something soon, we won't have enough gyros within 18 months. And then we will lose sorties."

A reminder on where you left it: "Last time we talked, we didn't yet have data on how often the testers were down, now we do." Then recap the conclusions of your last briefing and where you are going with this one. 

Help your audience just a bit!

DON'T make your briefing into an Agatha Christie novel where whodunit remains on the last page. Tell people what your conclusions are right up front: "I am going to show you data that tells us we have 18 months before serious impacts. And by "serious", I mean...."

It's only polite.

Communicating: The Hardest Thing We Do

The biggest barrier to good communication is human nature. 

When implementing the system sustainment management model, you quickly find that information-sharing becomes a top priority. The results of great assessment don't automatically become known to the teams that are identifying risks. And the ins and outs of a risk aren't immediately apparent to those designing programs to mitigate the risk. 

All mentally healthy humans see ourselves as something special. Why not? We are the stars of our lives. We came from somewhere and many of us have a solid plan on where we are going. 

This does result in some illogical behavior. 

Researchers have put slightly embarrassing T-shirts on people and put them in a room with others. The T-shirt person consistently reports feeling as though everyone was noticing them and judging them. The others consistently report not noticing the T-shirt and certainly not caring who might be wearing it. 

So much for special. 

Being all wrapped up in ourselves leads to a very predictable behavior during technical briefings. The person briefing launches immediately into the middle of their topic without setting the stage.

Anyone in the audience from ally to enemy, minion or decision-maker, is immediately at a loss as to what the topic is, why it is important, and how it affects them.

Start your briefings with:

A title that reflects the topic and is easily remembered, e.g. "High Failure Rates on Depot G7 Gyro Final Acceptance Automated Testing Equipment"

A one-sentence pitch on why this is important: "If we don't do something soon, we won't have enough gyros within 18 months. And then we will lose sorties."

A reminder on where you left it: "Last time we talked, we didn't yet have data on how often the testers were down, now we do." Then recap the conclusions of your last briefing and where you are going with this one. 

Help your audience just a bit!

DON'T make your briefing into an Agatha Christie novel where whodunit remains on the last page. Tell people what your conclusions are right up front: "I am going to show you data that tells us we have 18 months before serious impacts. And by "serious", I mean...."

It's only polite.

Areas of Further Research

Last January, I presented my sustainment management model at AIAA's SciTech conference. September, I told the SPACE 2016 folks how it can apply to commercial space. This coming January, I am presenting "first steps" in implementing the model. 

With this as a foundation, it is probably time to suggest areas of further research using this model. 

Here are some of my ideas. Do you have any to add?

·       Do costs increase and organizational efficiencies suffer when separate organizations are optimized for, for instance, parts control of jet engines, rather than using this model to sustain the entire weapon system?

·       How many members of organizations in a particular military branch, charged with sustaining a weapon system, see themselves primarily as sustainers and secondarily as engineers, item managers, program managers, etc.? Does this identity hamper better sustainment decisions?

·       Can every weapon system in a particular military organization’s inventory be precisely defined? Is its configuration precisely identified? Is the engineering authority defined? Do these definitions correspond to to the span of control, authority, and responsibility conferred on the sustainment organization?

·       Do organizations with process change mechanisms of less than 2 weeks out-perform those who take longer?

·       How many members of the sustainment organization under study can state how the warfighter’s mission is supported by the weapon system? Can they do this in terms of precisely defined readiness factors? Can they recognize when a problem with readiness is emerging?

·       What factors go onto the design of the sustainment organization’s organizational chart? Are separate entities such as uniformed military, civil service, and contractors effectively bound into teams?

·       Do all the members of a sustainment organization feel they have a method to voice their concerns about risks to the weapon system’s mission? Are they motivated to do so?

·       To what extent is each sustainment organization in a military component compelled to use a one-size-fits-all risk management approach? What inefficiencies does this create?

Abstract: An Affordable Complex System Assessment Program

In November, AIAA will call for papers for SPACE 2017. Here's one of mine:

Can your sustainment organization affordably observe and assess your complex ground and space system so that risks to continued service life are identified with enough lead time to mitigate? At SPACE 2016, the Complex System Sustainment Management Model was explained and applied to commercial space. At SciTech 2017, first steps in implementing the sustainment management model were presented with focus on risk identification. The next most important area is system observation which is described in this paper. It describes how a sustainment organization can create an affordable program that allows top management to keep your complex capabilities functioning as long as possible. And avoid expensive wholesale replacements. 

Introduction to my SciTech 2017 Paper

In January, I will be attending the AIAA SciTech Conference in Grapevine Texas (next to the Fort Worth airport). The paper I will be presenting at that conference is "First Steps..." in implementing a model for complex systems sustainment.

Just to tease you and get you to come to SciTech to hear my presentation, here's the introduction to my paper:

S

USTAINMENT managers and their teams would benefit greatly from a practical management model that describes the core activities they must perform for effective and affordable management of their complex systems.   

This paper is written for the leader who has spotted the historical trend to long-lived complex systems and realizes that they are working in an organization responsible to sustain a complex system. This person may be motivated to use this model, but be at a loss as to where to begin. This individual will most likely not have sufficient positional authority to simply declare that everyone must use this model. But this is actually a position of strength. Simply enforcing it as an edict will not yield any benefit. Management support and team support is essential for success. Implementation by edict will be seen as selling a product you never owned to begin with, that is, yet another management scam. For the model to become a permanent part of the organization’s culture, this support must be earned by executing it and then celebrating its successes.

Refer to my paper^[i] from AIAA’s SciTech 2016 for details of the model. It describes the method used to keep ICBMs a viable deterrent by considering the warfighter’s mission, the definition of the system, and the system’s readiness factors such as reliability and availability. It goes on to describe a method to observe the system, identify risks to sustainment, and how to mitigate the risks with sufficient lead time to satisfy the warfighter. Key enablers of people, process, and technology are discussed. It points out that the novice’s anxiety over the disconnect between warfighter needs and organizational funding is understandable and revealing. It is the sustainment organization’s task to close that gap, not simply expect requirements to arrive with funding. And the sustainment risk management model is key to mounting a campaign to get the funding. The model demands some hard work, top skills, and courageous leadership to be successful. But successful and affordable sustainment cannot occur without it.

The SciTech paper suggested that the model could be applied, not only to any weapon system, but to any complex system requiring sustainment. (Sustainment of non-complex systems would find costs outweigh benefits when applying the rigor and discipline of this model.) So another paper[ii] by the author and Kugler, presented at AIAA Space 2016, described how this model could be applied to one category of complex systems, commercial space. The author has also presented this model at an Internet of Things conference in Provo Utah, authors a blog on the subject, and proselytizes the model in other ways as well. When the model is applied outside of weapon systems, “warfighters” are “operators”. And “government funding sources” become “commercial funding sources”. But the model remains pretty much the same.

The Space 2016 paper also presented a short discussion on why this practical model is needed now: Complex systems are becoming more common and they are expected to live longer.

This sustainment management model is practical in that it is a) directly applicable to the sustainment of complex  systems employed today; b) integrated, that is, internally consistent; c) easily called to mind on the fly; d) self-improving; and e) constant, that is, unaffected by changing public laws, regulations, and management fads.

However, it is merely a model. That is, it is an idealized concept, albeit based on decades of practical experience. In response to a question at AIAA’s Space 2016, I responded that this management model is very much like Camelot: a idealized place or time. Or if the reader prefers, it is Plato’s “shadows on the cave wall” that reflect some idealized reality that exists somewhere, but only its shadows exist in our world. Like Camelot or Plato’s Shadows, the closer it is followed, despite the forces acting against it, the more ideal the outcomes. Unfortunate activities such as “management by crisis” are avoided, funding is more sure, and the warfighter (or operator) is happier.

An apparent oxymoron like “practical model” must have a practical approach to implementation to be taken seriously. To be practical, the approach must take into account the organization’s current path to better sustainment management, the implementer’s sphere of influence, and the forces acting against its implementation.

Since the risk identification function touches and influences all the other aspects of this management model, it is the best place to start. It can be used to assign a risk to poor system observation, create the information needed to create projects to mitigate the risks, tutor the team in relevant readiness metrics, and generally instill a devotion to the mission. Questions of “what is sustainment”, “what is included in my complex system”, and “why process discipline?” will repeatedly be raised, and hopefully answered, at risk management meetings.

This paper begins with a review of the standard definitions and an overview of the model. It then discusses in each subsequent section, evaluating the organization, advice to 3 types of leaders, and forces the implementer should anticipate. The conclusions section expounds on how to tell that the approach is working.

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[i] Vono, Charles, “Fundamentals of Weapon System Sustainment”, AIAA SciTech 2016, January 2016 (available at growkudos.com)

[ii] Vono, Charles and Kugler, “Application of a Weapon System Sustainment Model to the Space Industry” AIAA SPACE 2016, September 2016 (available at growkudos.com)