Areas of Further Research

Last January, I presented my sustainment management model at AIAA's SciTech conference. September, I told the SPACE 2016 folks how it can apply to commercial space. This coming January, I am presenting "first steps" in implementing the model. 

With this as a foundation, it is probably time to suggest areas of further research using this model. 

Here are some of my ideas. Do you have any to add?

·       Do costs increase and organizational efficiencies suffer when separate organizations are optimized for, for instance, parts control of jet engines, rather than using this model to sustain the entire weapon system?

·       How many members of organizations in a particular military branch, charged with sustaining a weapon system, see themselves primarily as sustainers and secondarily as engineers, item managers, program managers, etc.? Does this identity hamper better sustainment decisions?

·       Can every weapon system in a particular military organization’s inventory be precisely defined? Is its configuration precisely identified? Is the engineering authority defined? Do these definitions correspond to to the span of control, authority, and responsibility conferred on the sustainment organization?

·       Do organizations with process change mechanisms of less than 2 weeks out-perform those who take longer?

·       How many members of the sustainment organization under study can state how the warfighter’s mission is supported by the weapon system? Can they do this in terms of precisely defined readiness factors? Can they recognize when a problem with readiness is emerging?

·       What factors go onto the design of the sustainment organization’s organizational chart? Are separate entities such as uniformed military, civil service, and contractors effectively bound into teams?

·       Do all the members of a sustainment organization feel they have a method to voice their concerns about risks to the weapon system’s mission? Are they motivated to do so?

·       To what extent is each sustainment organization in a military component compelled to use a one-size-fits-all risk management approach? What inefficiencies does this create?