Chapter 3 A Sustainment History of the 20th Century -- Part 1

Here is a excerpt from my upcoming book, Fundamentals of Complex System Sustainment. This is the first 500 words of chapter 3. Feedback appreciated, just leave a comment.

If you don’t know history, then you don’t know anything.

You are a leaf that doesn’t know it is part of a tree.

-       Michael Crichton

Chapter 3: A Sustainment History of the 20^th Century

This chapter provides a unique view of 20^th century history meant to explain how the sustainment management model described in this book came about. It draws a line from the invention of strategic bombardment to the complex weapon systems required to execute this doctrine to the unique management methods required to sustain it. The most difficult strategic bombardment weapon system to keep in top shape was and is Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

The only ICBM employed by the United States at this time, and the oldest, is Minuteman III.

Imagine the task. Hundreds of missiles capable of precisely sending a nuclear bomb to the other side of the world must be kept on short countdown to be launched at a moment’s notice. They must not be used if they are not reliable. The nuclear bomb must be protected from theft or un-commanded fusing. If attacked, they must survive. And they are stored in hundreds of impenetrable underground silos across thousands of square mile of desolate terrain subject to the harshest weather conditions.

In addition, over the decades, from Minuteman III deployment in 1970 to the present, sustainers of the Minuteman Weapon System have modified the Minuteman weapon system in small and large ways to preserve mission capability and ensure it remains a formidable leg of the nuclear deterrence triad, to

maintain the weapon system capability,

satisfy the warfighter and

support the mission.

Just a few publically acknowledged examples will suffice:

replaced guidance system electronics

re-poured solid rocket motors

deployed a new launch console

updated monitoring software

published thousands of pages of improved maintenance manuals

updated training devices

built better transporting trucks and

replaced environmentally-banned fluids and epoxies.

Remarkably, through it all, the system appears exactly the same to the casual eye.

Over the same time period, the ICBM sustainment process itself has evolved to become more effective and efficient. A few examples:

The sustainment risk management system has developed innovations to include replacement lead time factors into the standard impact/likelihood measures

a 3-axis shaker and audio-speaker test rig were both deployed in the environmental test facility for more realistic testing of the guidance system and other upper stage components

integrated long-range plans for deployment of a slew of major changes were created and executed with daily tracking and

processes were institutionalized to ensure discipline.

Two key forces were at work to make this happen: Generally longer-lived weapon systems (and Minuteman in particular), and increasingly difficult fights for funding as ICBM national priority fell. These forces were amplified by the uniqueness of the ICBM systems and the increasing paucity of top ranking expert missileers who had their hands on the USAF checkbooks.

But before detailing how these forces created the sustainment model described in this book, three seemingly unrelated questions should be raised and put to rest: How is it that this sustainment management model is so little-known? How did complex weapon systems develop in the 20^th century? What forces pushed these weapon systems to remain in service far past their design lifetimes?